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VICTORIA A. BELK BROOKS

The Pregnancy Problem: Rethinking Workplace
Accommodation Claims Under Title VII’s
Pregnancy Discrimination Act
ABSTRACT
Pregnancy has become more than just a women’s issue; it has become an
employment law issue. As more and more women have joined the workforce
in the last four decades, the law regarding pregnant employees’ rights to
reasonable workplace accommodations has yet to catch up. The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, enacted in 1978, was a step in the right direction to
ensure pregnant women’s rights in the workplace. However, the statute itself
and the judicial interpretation resulted in empty promises to pregnant
employees when litigation ensues. Employers and employees still lack clarity
in their understandings of whether a pregnant employee is entitled to receive
accommodations in the workplace. Although the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify a pregnant employee’s right to workplace accommodations in
Young vs. UPS, Inc., it left an important question unanswered. This
unanswered question centers around claims brought under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) and is based on the refusal of workplace
accommodations to pregnant employees.
Although the Court in Young clarified how an employee can bring a claim
of this type under the McDonnell Douglas framework, it left open the
question of who is an appropriate comparator. Identifying a comparator is
an important element in bringing a discrimination claim under the PDA,
because it determines whether the employer denied the accommodations in
a discriminatory manner. This comparator question had split the circuits
before Young, and it will continue to do so because of the ambiguity in the
Court’s recent opinion. Although both the petitioner and the respondent
introduced the two main competing circuit views on who an appropriate
comparator is, the Court adopted neither. The narrow view is that the
employer may adopt a pregnancy-blind policy that looks past the pregnancy
and only grants accommodations based on whether a regular employee
without the limitation is granted accommodations. The broad view instead
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looks at whether an employee with a similar limitation is given
accommodations that a pregnant employee should also receive.
Although the Court did not adopt either of these views, this Note proposes
a better way to address the Court’s interpretation of the comparator question
left open in Young. In doing so, both employers and pregnant employees
would have a better understanding of their rights and obligations, which
would ultimately provide more protection for both parties. This Note
proposes that the Court should consider a source-based or effect-based
approach to answering this question. In these approaches, the source or effect
would be the distinguishing factor in deciding whether the discrimination
claim succeeds. In a source-based analysis, the employer would consider the
source of the limitation or disability and accommodate based on that source.
However, in an effect-based analysis, the employer would consider the
limitation or disability itself, then whether it generally accommodates that
limitation or disability, and the employer would provide accommodations on
that basis. Although both approaches would answer the Court’s question left
open in Young, the better approach would be the effect-based approach. The
effect-based approach better extends the opportunity for pregnant employees
to receive workplace accommodations. It also allows employers to consider
an employee’s limitation or disability equally, focusing on the ability to work
and not on the pregnancy. The effect-based approach is better aligned with
Congress’s intent to overrule Gilbert and achieve equality for pregnant
employees in the workplace.
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Lucas, for his unwavering support and enduring patience during this
journey, and to my father and mother, David and Julianne, for the education
they provided to me and the wisdom they continue to impart to me.
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NOTE
THE PREGNANCY PROBLEM: RETHINKING WORKPLACE
ACCOMMODATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII’S PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT
Victoria A. Belk Brooks†
I. INTRODUCTION
When pregnancy complications arise for an employee, both the employer
and employee must have clarity in their rights and responsibilities regarding
reasonable workplace accommodations. Congress created the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) to expand Title VII’s sex discrimination
protections to pregnant employees.1 Under the PDA, pregnant employees
can bring a claim against their employers if they are discriminated against on
the basis of their pregnancies.2 Discrimination against pregnant employees
may occur in a number of ways; however, this Note examines the
discriminatory manner in which employers deny workplace
accommodations to pregnant employees. While the PDA protects pregnant
employees from discrimination, courts have had difficulty providing a
uniform interpretation of the PDA when a pregnant employee brings a
disparate treatment claim.3 Although disparate treatment claims for
workplace discrimination have been brought under the McDonnell Douglas
framework since 1973,4 the Court finally answered the question of whether
this framework applies to pregnancy discrimination in Young v. UPS, Inc.5
†
Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16, Liberty University
Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.S., magna cum
laude, Government: Politics & Policies, Liberty University (2018). This Note is written with
much gratitude to my husband, Lucas, for his unwavering support and enduring patience
during this journey, and to my father and mother, David and Julianne, for the education they
provided to me and the wisdom they continue to impart to me.
1
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1,
92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
2
See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
3
See discussion infra Section II.C.
4
See infra Section II.B.3 (explaining the application of the McDonnell Douglas
framework to PDA claims). See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–03 (1973) (holding a disparate treatment claim may be brought under Title VII using a
burden-shifting framework in which the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by an
initial showing of discrimination, now known as the McDonnell Douglas framework).
5
See generally Young v. UPS, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 210–12 (2015).
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However, the Court stopped there, creating a new issue. This issue arises
when the court analyzes the employee’s claim under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, which requires the employee to identify and to compare her
treatment to similarly situated employees to prove discrimination.6 Because
the PDA does not identify the appropriate employee comparison in its
language,7 the question of an appropriate comparator has been left to the
courts.8 In light of this, courts have failed to answer this question, and even
the Supreme Court in Young declined to answer this question.9
Defining a comparator is foundational to understanding whether the
denial of workplace accommodations to pregnant employees has occurred in
a discriminatory manner. By leaving the comparator question unanswered,
the Court left employers exposed to the risk of litigation, and pregnant
employees without an understanding of their accommodation rights. This
gap in understanding what accommodations are mandated has created a grey
area in PDA compliance. Although inconclusive on the matter, the Court’s
most recent case on this issue, Young, considered different interpretations of
whom the Act prescribes as a comparator.10 In Young, both the respondent
and the petitioner provided comprehensive interpretations of an appropriate
comparator.11 Additionally, various scholars and organizations provided
solutions of an appropriate comparator in PDA cases.12 These types of
comparators range from nonpregnant peers to those with disabilities as
defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).13 However, the
Supreme Court’s comparator analysis should range beyond specific classes of
similar employees. A better solution is to look at the underlying basis of
establishing a comparator, such as the distinguishing factor of whether the
source of the limitation or the effect of the limitation is considered. If the
source is considered, the employer should decide whether to accommodate
the employee by looking at the source of the injury, but if the effect is
6

See generally McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804.
See infra Section II.B.2.
8
The term “comparator” is used throughout the Note to describe the individual(s) that
the employee must use to identify and compare the approval or denial of reasonable
accommodations. The comparison then provides a discriminatory presumption that the
employer denied reasonable accommodations to the pregnant employee in a discriminatory
manner.
9
See generally Young, 575 U.S. at 210, 228.
10
Id.
11
See Brief for Respondent, Young v. UPS, Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015) (No. 12-1226);
Petitioner’s Brief, Young v. UPS, Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015) (No. 12-1226).
12
See discussion infra Sections II.C, IV.A.1.
13
See discussion infra Sections II.C, IV.A.1.
7
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considered, the employer should look at the employee’s disability and
provide accommodations based on the limitations of the disability itself. This
Note examines the different interpretations of whom an appropriate
comparator is when disparate treatment claims arise out of the denial of
reasonable workplace accommodations and provides a clearer solution for
employers and employees by answering the comparator question with the
source versus effects distinction.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act

After the 1950s, the number of women participating in the workforce grew
exponentially.14 By 1970, 43% of women were in the workforce, and by 1980,
51% of women were in the workforce.15 With the growing number of women
in the workforce, the battle for equality in the workplace was further
complicated by pregnancy.16 The lack of protection for pregnant women in
the workforce dramatically affected women’s career opportunities, impacting
both their children and their families.17 Many women were considering the
balance between motherhood and working for the first time as the idea of the
traditional family evoved alongside the advancement of modern medicine.
The increasing proportion of working women with the potential to become
working mothers prompted a critical need for each woman to “be fully
protected against the harmful effects of unjust employment discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy.”18
Although there were no explicit legal protections for pregnancy until the
PDA was enacted in 1978,19 women attempted to bring claims under broad
Title VII protections.20 These claims were brought under Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.21 The argument that Title
VII protected pregnancy stemmed from the idea that “pregnancy” is an
inherently female activity that women, as a sex, are affected by, therefore,
14

U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Changes in Men’s and Women’s Labor Force Participation
Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 10, 2007),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.htm.
15
Id.
16
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LAB. AND HUM. RES., 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 PUB. L. 95-555, at III (Comm. Print 1980).
17
Id. at 12.
18
Id. at III.
19
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 95555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
20
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1976).
21
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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resulting in the protection of pregnancy itself.22 However, it was clear that
claims under Title VII could not proceed under this notion when the
Supreme Court, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, held that the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities from an employee’s disability plan did not
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23
The Court’s decision in Gilbert demonstrated the lack of protection that
pregnant women had under Title VII and prompted a congressional
discussion about women in the workforce and their workplace protections;
ultimately, it set in motion new legislation to protect pregnant employees.24
B.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act

One year after the decision in Gilbert, Congress introduced the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.25 Congress understood that this legislation was “made
necessary” after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gilbert.26
1.

Congressional Intent

Senator Williams, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor and
principal sponsor of the PDA, considered Gilbert “a critical blow” and “major
setback in the battle for women’s rights.”27 He also emphasized in committee
hearings the “devasting [economic and social] effects [pregnancy
discrimination has] on entire families.”28 The concern was that women
disabled by pregnancy would be unable to provide for themselves and their
families.29 The belief surrounding the congressional debates on the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act demonstrated congressional enactment of
this bill would provide for disability due to pregnancy on an equal basis with
other medical disabilities.30 The Act was intended “to restore basic rights
to . . . working women” and “require employers to treat women affected by
pregnancy . . . equally for all employment-related purposes.”31

22

Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 128–29.
Id. at 145–46.
24
Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on
Lab. of the S. Comm. on Hum. Res., 95th Cong. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings].
25
S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 1–2 (1977).
26
Hearings, supra note 24, at 1.
27
Id. at 1, 6.
28
Id. at 1–2.
29
Id. at 2.
30
Id. at 33–34 (statements of Ethel Bent Walsh, Vice Chairman of the EEOC, and Alexis
Herman, Dir. of the Women’s Bureau for the U.S. Dep’t of Lab.).
31
Id. at 2.
23
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Language of the Act

On October 31, 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act became law, and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to prohibit sex
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.32 The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), states:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in
section 703(h) of this title [§ 2000e-2(h)] shall be interpreted
to permit otherwise.33
The Act is generally considered to contain two clauses that should be read
and interpreted together.34 The first clause expanded the definition of
“‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’” to include “because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”35 The second clause
of the PDA states that women “shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.”36 The second clause provides the basis for
pregnant employees to bring discrimination claims against their employer.37
The need for a comparator to prove a discrimination claim arises from the
PDA’s language “other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work.”38 When applied to disparate treatment claims, this
language is interpreted to require the plaintiff to provide evidence that shows
the employer intentionally treated the employee less favorably because of the

32

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 95555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
33
Id.
34
See generally Young v. UPS, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 212 (2015).
35
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 95555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
36
Id.
37
See generally Young, 575 U.S. at 212.
38
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 95555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
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employee’s protected trait—pregnancy.39
3.

McDonnell Douglas’ Application to Claims Under the PDA

The McDonnell Douglas framework is used to analyze disparate treatment
claims under the PDA, and the Court affirmed this use in Young.40 The
McDonnell Douglas framework requires the employee to show “that she
belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the
employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate
others ‘similar in their ability or inability to work’” to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.41 Once the employee has provided evidence to
establish all four requirements, the employer has the opportunity “to justify
its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on ‘legitimate,
nondiscriminatory’ reasons for denying her accommodation.”42 The
employee may rebut the employer’s reason for denying an accommodation
by showing it was a pretext for discrimination.43
Employees bringing PDA claims have a difficult time surviving summary
judgment because the employee, under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
is unable to establish a comparator (one who is similar in ability or inability
to work).44 Without the ability to establish a comparator, the employee is
unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and the employee’s
case is dismissed. The broad comparison language used in the Act has
prompted an uphill court battle for most women seeking relief under it. If a
comparator had been defined in the PDA, the courts would look to the
employee for their analysis of whether a prima facie case had been made. A
clear understanding of who is an appropriate comparator is vital to the
survival of disparate treatment claims under the PDA. Since this issue has
been left to the courts to decide, there has been a lack of uniformity in their
interpretation. 45
C.

Circuit Split: Narrow vs. Broad Interpretation of the Act
Since the PDA’s enactment, courts have varied their interpretations of

39

Young, 575 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 213.
41
Id. at 229 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
42
Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
43
Id.
44
See id.
45
See generally Young v. UPS, Inc., 784 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 575 U.S. 206
(2015); Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996); Troupe v. May Dept. Stores
Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184
(10th Cir. 2000); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).
40
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who the identity of the “similarly situated” person is.46 Two main
interpretations have emerged from the courts. The first interpretation is
narrow and has been adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits.47 This interpretation is considered “narrow” because the
comparator is a nonpregnant employee.48 These courts consider treatment of
a pregnant employee to be nondiscriminatory when the pregnancy is not a
factor in accommodating the employee.49 The narrow interpretation allows
employers to implement pregnancy-blind or pregnancy-neutral policies that
prohibit an employer from distinguishing between pregnant and
nonpregnant employees of similar ability.50 This interpretation also allows
employers to distinguish between two employees’ accommodations,51 if, for
example, both employees suffer a significant injury.52
The broad interpretation of the second clause of the PDA has been
adopted by the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.53 This interpretation
requires the employer to treat a pregnant employee’s disability the same as a
46
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 95555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
47
See Young, 784 F.3d at 204 (holding that the employer’s pregnancy-blind policy did not
violate the PDA); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating
that there is not “an affirmative obligation on employers to grant preferential treatment to
pregnant women”); Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (holding that the PDA does not require
employers to provide accommodations to pregnant women in their place of employment; it
only requires employees to “ignore an employee’s pregnancy”); Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313
(stating that an employer could “provide an accommodation to employees injured on the job
without extending this accommodation to pregnant employees” because “[u]nder the PDA,
the employer must ignore an employee’s pregnancy and treat her ‘as well as it would have if
she were not pregnant’” (quoting Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274 (7th
Cir. 1996))).
48
See Young, 784 F.3d at 204; Urbano, 138 F.3d at 207; Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738; Spivey, 136
F.3d at 1313.
49
Young, 784 F.3d at 201–02; Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir.
2006); Young, 575 U.S. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50
Young, 784 F.3d at 201.
51
Young, 575 U.S. at 224.
52
Id. at 218, 227.
53
Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff
may prove discriminatory practices by establishing that similarly situated employees with
disabilities received preferential treatment); Deneen v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 437
(8th Cir. 1998) (stating that the “relevant question in a pregnancy discrimination case is
whether the employer treated the pregnant plaintiff ‘differently than nonpregnant
employees’”); EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a prima facie discrimination case may be brought when nonpregnant
employees who have suffered an off the job injury are offered accommodations and a
plaintiff with pregnancy-related injuries is not).
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nonpregnant employee’s disability when the nonpregnant employee is
similar in ability or inability to perform the same job functions.54 An
employer must not distinguish between the sources of the disabilities;
instead, if the employer accommodates one employee’s disability, it must
accommodate a disability that arises from pregnancy.55 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit interprets the comparator to be one
who receives accommodations and is similar in inability to work, meaning
the court considered the disability itself and the manifestations of it, not the
fact that it resulted from the pregnancy.56
1.

The Court’s Attempt to Resolve a Circuit Split: Young v.
UPS, Inc.

After decades of litigating claims under the PDA, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the Fourth Circuit’s most recent ruling on pregnancy
discrimination.57 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve this
circuit split and provide a better understanding of workplace
accommodations for employees and employers.58 It was time for the Court to
take on this issue; as of March 2014, close to 71% of women in the workforce
were mothers with children under eighteen.59 Ultimately, close to threefourths60 of women in the workforce have been or would be impacted
regarding their right to be free from pregnancy-based discrimination in the
workforce. On the other hand, this means that most of these women’s
employers would also be affected by how the law treats pregnancy
discrimination. By resolving the split, pregnant employees would have clarity
in understanding their right to accommodations and legal protections under
the PDA. Employers and businesses would also benefit from clarity in
understanding the obligations to their employees because it would allow
them to allocate finances for reasonable accommodations, educate their

54

See Ensley-Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1226; Deneen, 132 F.3d at 437; Horizon, 220 F.3d at
1199, 1200.
55
Young, 575 U.S. at 224.
56
Ensley-Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1226.
57
Young, 575 U.S. at 206.
58
Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, Afterbirth: The Supreme Court's Ruling in
Young v. UPS Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS & COMMENT
FROM JUSTIA (Apr. 20, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirth-the-supremecourts-ruling-in-young-v-ups-leaves-many-questions-unanswered.
59
U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stats., Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.
at 2 (Dec. 2015), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/archive/women-inthe-labor-force-a-databook-2015.pdf.
60
Id.
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managers, and avoid litigation. Young represents the Court’s latest attempt
to clarify the meaning of the PDA for the thousands of employees and
employers that litigate pregnancy discrimination claims each year.61
III. YOUNG V. UPS, INC.
A.

Background and State Court Proceedings

Peggy Young was an employee for United Parcel Service (UPS).62 She
began her employment in 1999 and became a driver by 2002.63 As a driver,
she was assigned to pick up and deliver packages that arrived by air carrier.64
Drivers in this position were required to load and unload their trucks when
picking up and making deliveries.65 UPS has a seventy-pound lifting
requirement for its employees in Young’s position.66 After Young had
suffered two unsuccessful rounds of in vitro fertilization, she became
pregnant.67 In September 2006, she informed her supervisor with a note from
her doctor stating “she should not lift more than twenty pounds for the first
twenty weeks of her pregnancy and not more than ten pounds thereafter.”68
UPS’s occupational health manager explained to Young that UPS’s policy
stated that she could not to continue work if she had a twenty-pound lifting
restriction.69
However, Young tried to continue working with the help of other UPS
employees that agreed to assist her.70 After Young received another note
regarding her lifting restrictions, she informed her supervisor again of the
twenty-pound restriction and requested “light duty work.”71 Young’s
supervisor concluded that she “was unable to perform the essential functions
of her job and was ineligible for light duty assignment.”72 The supervisor
explained that UPS only “offered light duty for those with on-the-job injuries,
61

See Pregnancy Discrimination Charges FY 2010–FY 2020, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/pregnancy-discrimination-charges-fy-2010-fy-2020 (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021).
62
Young v. UPS, Inc., 784 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Young, 784 F.3d at 195.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 196.
72
Id.
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those accommodated under the ADA, and those who had lost D[epartment]
O[f] T[ransportation (DOT)] certification, but not for pregnancy.”73 Young
wanted to continue working, so she approached the division manager who
dismissed her desire to continue working by explaining “she was ‘too much
of a liability’ while pregnant and that she ‘could not come back . . . until [she]
was no longer pregnant.’”74 Young’s unpaid leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act expired in November 2006 since she had used it for her
attempts to become pregnant, so she decided to take an extended leave of
absence in which she received no pay and eventually lost her medical
insurance.75 By May 2007, Young had given birth and returned to work for
UPS.76 Young filed allegations of “discrimination on the basis
of . . . pregnancy” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in July 2007.77 By September 2008, the EEOC issued a right to sue
letter.78 Young filed suit against UPS in October 2008.79 Thereafter, the court
granted summary judgment for UPS.80 The district court concluded that
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Young failed to establish a claim
because she could not identify a “similarly situated comparator who received
more favorable treatment than she did.”81 Young subsequently appealed the
district court ruling.82
The Fourth Circuit considered the “core contention” of Young’s claim to
be “the UPS policy limiting light duty work to some employees—those
injured on-the-job, disabled within the meaning of the ADA, or who have
lost their DOT certification—but not to pregnant workers like Young violates
the PDA's command to treat pregnant employees the same” under the PDA’s
second clause.83 Young contended this was discriminatory because the PDA
requires employers to treat their employees “as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work.”84 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that she could not fulfill the last element of the McDonnell Douglas
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id.
Young, 784 F.3d at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Young, 784 F.3d at 197.
Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 200–01.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
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framework because she could not “establish that similarly situated employees
received more favorable treatment than she did, and therefore [could not]
establish the fourth element of the prima facie case for pregnancy
discrimination.”85 The court refused to adopt Young’s definition of an
appropriate comparator under the ADA; instead the court reasoned that she
was “not similar in her ‘ability or inability to work’ to an employee disabled
within the meaning of the ADA . . . or injured on the job.”86 The court further
reasoned, “Young is dissimilar to an employee disabled under the ADA for
the same reason she herself was not disabled: her lifting limitation was
temporary and not a significant restriction on her ability to perform major
life activities.”87 As a result, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding that UPS’s “neutral, pregnancy-blind policy” was lawful under the
PDA.88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Young’s case in 2014.89
B.

Petitioner’s Argument vs. Respondent’s Argument

Petitioner and Respondent argued for widely differing interpretations of
the appropriate PDA comparator in their briefs. Each party disagreed on how
to interpret and apply the PDA’s second clause as it refers to “other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”90 The Court
considered both interpretations but declined to adopt either of them in
Young.91
1.

Petitioner’s Argument

Young’s position on the interpretation of the PDA aligns with the broader
interpretation among the circuits. Her brief stated that “the PDA’s second
clause requires an employer to provide the same accommodations to
workplace disabilities caused by pregnancy that it provides to workplace
disabilities that have other causes but have a similar effect on the ability to
work.”92 Young argued that the second clause functions to ensure that when
an employer accommodates one subset of workers with disabilities, the PDA
requires pregnant employees of similar ability to also receive
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accommodations.93 By contrast, if an employer accommodates none of its
workers, then it does not have to accommodate pregnant women.94 The main
distinction is that employers must treat pregnant employees the same as
other groups of similar workers.95 Young supported her argument with the
general meaning of the statutory text, in which the phrase “as other persons”
plainly means that “when an employer accommodates a group of workers, it
must give pregnant workers with similar limitations the same treatment.”96
The Petitioner then provided the Court with options of a similar
comparator that could be used in its analysis.97 The brief presented three
categories that Young could have been compared to in this case; however, the
most relevant and broadly applicable was comparing Young’s disability to
those covered by the ADA.98 The Petitioner summed up her argument by
stating that:
If her lifting restriction had resulted from an ADAqualifying disability, UPS would have offered Young
accommodated work. But because her restriction resulted
from her pregnancy—which is not an “impairment” and
thus cannot be an ADA disability, see 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630
App. § 1630.2(h)—the company refused to provide her the
same treatment. That violates the plain text of the PDA.99
According to Young, the relevant question under the PDA should have been
whether she was similar to other employees.100 Because the PDA does not
prescribe an inquiry into whether a disability was temporary or affected an
employee’s major life activities, Young argued that the scope of inquiry
should end with whether she is like other employees under the PDA.101
2.

Respondent’s Argument

Respondent, UPS, argued that the Court should adopt the narrower
interpretation of the PDA’s second clause.102 “Under this view, courts would
compare the accommodations an employer provides to pregnant women
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 29.
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Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30–45.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 11, at 30–45.
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Id. at 39.
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with the accommodations it provides to others within a facially neutral
category (such as those with off-the-job injuries) to determine whether the
employer has violated Title VII.”103 UPS argued that allowing only pregnant
women who fell within a disability category to receive accommodations was
a nondiscriminatory policy.104 The manager testified that she had never
authorized light-duty assignments for off-the-job injuries unless it was an
ADA qualifying disability.105 Therefore, Young’s injury from pregnancy fell
within the same classification as an employee with an off-the-job injury that
UPS would not accommodate.106 UPS maintained that its reasoning for not
giving accommodations was that it created a “pregnancy-blind policy” as
required by the PDA.107
UPS reiterated that the PDA does not mandate that employers
accommodate special treatment for pregnant employees.108 They argued that
the statute’s ordinary and plain meaning is unclear in defining the
comparator and is only clear on allowing disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims to be brought by pregnant women.109 UPS also argued that
each branch of government supported the narrow interpretation: courts have
held that pregnancy neutral policies are nondiscriminatory; Congress has yet
to adopt positive law regarding accommodations; and, on behalf of the
executive branch, the Department of Justice stated the PDA is only an
expansion on the definition of sex.110
C.

The Decision
1.

Majority Opinion

The majority opinion adopted neither Respondent’s nor Petitioner’s
arguments.111 The Court stated that Young’s view was too broad and
ultimately would grant pregnant women “‘most-favored-nation’ status.”112
Whereas, the Court found that UPS’s interpretation failed to satisfy the
congressional object of overturning Gilbert, in which the distinguishing
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factor was based on a “neutral ground.”113 The Court’s analysis centered
around applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to claims brought under
the PDA based on circumstantial evidence.114 The Court held that if an
employee brings a disparate treatment claim under the PDA, she must show
“that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that
the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did
accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’”115 Once
the employee establishes these four elements, “[t]he employer may then seek
to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on ‘legitimate,
nondiscriminatory’ reasons for denying her accommodation.”116 The Court
clarified that, in PDA cases, neither expense nor convenience is considered a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for denying the pregnant employee’s
accommodation request.117 The employee may then show that the employer’s
reasons are insufficient to justify its actions but instead are a pretext for
intentional discrimination.118 The Court ended its analysis of this framework
by reaffirming that once the employee creates a genuine dispute of material
fact, the case may proceed past summary judgment.119
The Court’s analysis of the McDonnell Douglas framework stops short in
one area: the comparator analysis. Although both Petitioner and Respondent
identified appropriate comparators for the Court, the Court declined to
subscribe to either view and reiterated that “[t]he plaintiff can create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by
providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of
pregnant workers.”120 The analysis stopped short because the Court only
stated that the plaintiff had to show accommodation of “nonpregnant
workers;” thus it is unclear whether the Court was pointing to nonpregnant
workers with the same disability or nonpregnant workers with no
disability.121
The Court supported its approach by holding that it “is consistent with
our longstanding rule that a plaintiff can use circumstantial proof to rebut an
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
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employer’s apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for treating
individuals within a protected class differently than those outside the
protected class.”122 The majority addressed Congress’s intent in enacting the
PDA, stating the PDA was passed to overrule Gilbert and that
accommodations denied to pregnant women on a neutral basis are
nondiscriminatory.123 The majority rebuked the dissent’s argument that the
statutory language “treated the same” means “on the same basis as it denied
accommodations to other employees.”124 The Court ultimately held that
under this framework, Young had sufficiently fulfilled her burden of
establishing a genuine dispute of material fact.125 She demonstrated that
under the fourth prong of the analysis, there was a genuine dispute regarding
UPS’s policies of providing accommodations to nonpregnant employees.126
The Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
directing it to consider combining these policies and the employer’s
justifications.127
2.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Alito concurred in the judgment to emphasize the interpretation of
the second clause.128 He reasoned that the addition of the PDA to Title VII
was an addition of pregnancy to adverse employment actions and should “be
treated like discrimination because of race, sex, etc.”129 Therefore, when an
employer deliberately treats a pregnant employee less favorably than an
employee similarly situated in ability or inability to work, an unlawful
employment practice occurs.130 In Justice Alito’s opinion, the statute states
that pregnant employees must be treated the same as those who are “similar
in their ability or inability to work,” making the comparator “employees
performing the same or very similar jobs.”131 Therefore, the employee’s
comparator is another employee performing the same job, but not an
employee who has a similar injury.132 The employer can deny
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accommodations to pregnant women so long as it denies accommodations
to those in similar jobs based on a “neutral business reason,” other than
convenience or cost.133 In Young, UPS was unable to provide a neutral
business reason for failing to accommodate pregnant employees while
accommodating “at least some” of its nonpregnant employees.134
3.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion focused on interpreting the statute’s text rather
than the majority’s “policy-driven compromise between the possible
readings of the law.”135 Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia stated “[t]he
most natural way to understand the same-treatment clause is that an
employer may not distinguish between pregnant women and others of
similar ability or inability because of pregnancy.”136 Therefore, denying
accommodations to pregnant women “on the same terms” as other workers
was a correct application because the employer had complied with the statute
in the sense that the pregnant employee was “treated the same” as other
employees.137 If the same treatment clause was to be interpreted otherwise,
the pregnant employees would be the “most favored employees,” which is
contrary to Title VII’s purpose.138
While advocating for a textual-based interpretation of the clause, the
dissent pointed out only two possible ways this statute could have been
interpreted.139 In the dissent’s view the majority went awry and accepted
neither the “natural” narrow view of the statute nor the broad policy-driven
view.140 It decided to settle in the middle of the two viewpoints and created “a
new law that is splendidly unconnected with the text and even the legislative
history of the Act.”141 Further, the dissent contended that this was why the
majority “[did] not even try to connect the interpretation it adopt[ed] with
the text it purport[ed] to interpret.”142 The dissent concluded by stating that
Young did not establish a prima facie case because she failed to demonstrate
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that UPS violated the PDA’s same-treatment requirement.143 Dissenting
separately, Justice Kennedy emphasized the disadvantages pregnant women
face in the workplace and the PDA’s legislative significance.144
IV. PROPOSAL
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Young, many scholars and
litigators believed a more precise interpretation of the PDA’s second clause
was needed.145 Because the circuits courts widely differed in their
interpretations, the Court could have adopted one of the already articulated
narrow or broad interpretations of the statute.146 Instead, the Court
attempted to settle the interpretation somewhere in the middle. Although
reaching a middle ground between interpretations is not inherently an
undesirable place for a court to rule, the Court’s middle ground decision in
Young proved to be undesirable. At first glance, the decision in Young
provides a clear application of the McDonnell Douglas framework. However,
in its attempt to apply the framework, the Court left open a fundamental
question: who are the employees that are “similar in their ability or inability
to work” to pregnant employees requesting accommodations?147 An answer
to this question would impact all employers and employees that encounter
pregnancy. By leaving this fundamental question unanswered, the Court left
employers and employees without clarity. This lack of clarity creates new
liability for employers and leaves pregnant employees uncertain about their
rights to workplace accommodations. Employers should have clear
instructions on the extent to which they should accommodate pregnant
employees, and pregnant employees should be able to understand their right
to accommodations under the PDA in comparison to their colleagues.
A.

A Clearer Solution to Answering the Comparator Question

In Young, the Court held that, in order to establish a prima facie case, an
employee must show that “she belongs to the protected class, that she sought
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accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the
employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or inability to
work.’”148 Although all of the elements are interrelated, the first three may be
the most transparent in allowing a plaintiff to proceed past the summary
judgment stage. However, the fourth prong of the analysis proves to be the
most complicated in its application, because it requires the employee to
identify other employees “similar in their ability or inability to work” with
which the employee should be compared.149 Petitioners, Respondents, and
amici proposed various comparators to the Young Court; however, the Court
chose not to accept any of them and failed to identify a comparator.150
By not identifying a comparator, the Court failed to give pregnant women
a clear understanding of whether they had been discriminated against. A
pregnant employee should be able to understand her right to
accommodations and whether she has been discriminated against in
receiving reasonable workplace accommodations. This is a unique situation
for employees because they may not know to whom in the workplace they
may compare themselves. For example, when racial discrimination occurs,
an employee knows he can look at how people of other races were treated.151
But with a pregnant employee, the question becomes: to whom do they look
for a comparison?
On the other hand, the Court’s decision also failed to assist employers in
understanding their obligation to provide accommodations. Are employers
supposed to accommodate the disability of each individual employee because
they accommodated others, or are they to accommodate the individual
because of a pregnancy? These questions demonstrate the practical
implications of the PDA and its interpretation.
The Court’s definition of a comparator is essential because it affects an
employer and employee’s understanding of the PDA. The Court’s holding
affirmed that pregnant employees can bring a disparate treatment claim for
being denied reasonable accommodations by their employer, and the
evidence to establish their case hinges on how they were treated compared to
other employees.152 Furthermore, the holding seems clear until the practical
issue of collecting evidence to establish this comparison arises and raises a
series of questions that are fundamental to establishing a prima facie case.
For example, how does an employee know that she has a discrimination claim
148
149
150
151
152
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when her employer denies her accommodations required by her pregnancy
but grants accommodations to another employee? The holding also raises
questions for employers. Do employers have to offer pregnant employees
accommodations if they offer them to other disabled employees? If
employers do so, are they discriminating because they are treating pregnant
employees differently because of the pregnancy? How can an employer
comply with Title VII and protect itself from litigation if it is unclear as to
whom it must provide reasonable accommodations? These are only a few of
the questions the Court created with its decision in Young. However, these
questions can be answered by considering a series of solutions for the next
employer and pregnant employee facing this dilemma.
1.

ADA-Accommodated Employees

Many scholars have advocated that “ADA-accommodated employees are
appropriate comparators for PDA analysis” because the disabilities of both
employees are similar.153 Under the ADA, it is “unlawful for employers to
discriminate against individuals because of a qualifying disability and
requires employers to make ‘reasonable accommodations.’”154 The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) expanded the coverage of disabilities
but did not directly address pregnancy concerns.155 This expansion also
requires employers to provide accommodations for temporary restrictions,
which strengthens the argument for why pregnancy disabilities should be
likened to other disabilities covered by the ADA.156 Although pregnant
employees face similar disabilities, many women cannot qualify under the
ADA because of the interpretation of the definition of disability.157 The
ADAAA’s expansion of the definition of a “major life activity” now includes
reproductive function, which may include some qualifying disabilities caused
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by pregnancy;158 however, pregnancy “falls short” from being covered as a
disability and is still excluded from being considered a disability under the
ADAAA.159 A better understanding of the disabilities that arise from
pregnancy would lead to an improved approach in providing reasonable
workplace accommodations under the PDA.160
If employees protected under the ADA could be compared to employees
with similar disabilities caused by pregnancy, then it would broaden the
understanding of the comparator under the PDA. Instead of accommodating
an employee because of the pregnancy, the employer would accommodate
based on the disability. The ADA would be an appropriate comparator for
PDA claims. However, the basis of considering the ADA as a comparator
could be reimagined as a more fundamental solution. Instead of the
comparator being a specific class of individuals, such as the ADA, the Court
should look beyond the specific comparators mentioned and consider
whether the “effect” of the disability should be accommodated or whether the
disability should be accommodated on the basis of the “source.”161
2.

Rethinking Comparators

To provide a better understanding of the PDA for both employees and
employers, the Court should re-think and consider a deeper analysis of an
appropriate comparator by looking beyond the classes of comparators to a
general factor of comparison. The general factor of comparison would be
based on either the disability itself or how the disability was acquired. If this
analysis was adopted, cases could be decided on a case-by-case basis by
providing a general distinguishing factor between different types of
accommodation-seeking employees. However, there are two main
considerations of what this factor should be. The first consideration is
whether the employees should be compared by the “source of their work
limitations,” by looking at the cause of the disability, and the second
consideration is the “effect of their work limitations,” which only considers
the disability and its limitations.162 These two interpretations would provide
a uniform understanding of comparators that could be established and
applied in any place of employment. However, both of these considerations
158
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have very different implications and further either a broad or narrow
interpretation of the second clause of the Act.
a.

Source-based comparison

The source of a work limitation refers to the reason for the disability.
When an employer considers the source of the disability, it is taking into
account how the disability came about and is providing accommodations to
the employee on that basis. This is a narrow approach to interpreting the
second clause of the PDA because it allows the employer to deny
accommodations for the disability because the need for an accommodation
arises out of pregnancy. Since this interpretation is narrower in scope, a
source-based analysis would ultimately lead to a comparison with
nonpregnant peers because the PDA requires employers to not distinguish
among their employees based on pregnancy.163 The support for a sourcebased comparator is the plain text of the statute, that states “women affected
by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same . . . as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work.”164 Dissenting in Young, Justice
Scalia pointed out the “most natural way” to understand the PDA is by
reading the second clause as requiring an employer to refrain from making
decisions based on a woman’s pregnancy.165 In allowing the comparator to be
based on the source, the focus is purely interpreting “same” to mean equal
treatment, not preferential treatment because of the employee’s pregnancy.166
When pregnancy becomes a motivating factor for an employer, then the
employer has violated the PDA’s intention and Title VII’s guarantee of
equality.167
Additionally, consideration of a source-based comparator raises the
argument of congressional intent. Congress has not affirmatively required
employers to provide accommodations under the PDA.168 Since the PDA was
an addition to Title VII’s definition, it is an extension of discrimination
protection—not an accommodation law.169 It does not extend
163
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accommodations as the ADA does, and if it was meant to be interpreted to
provide accommodations, then the plain text would have expounded upon
accommodations.170 Therefore, under a source-based analysis, if an employer
provides accommodations, then it directly violates the PDA as it currently
stands, permitting the employer to compare the pregnant employee to her
nonpregnant peers, on the basis of her pregnancy; and, employers are at risk
of providing accommodations unequally and elevating their pregnant
employees unfairly.
b.

Effect-based comparison

The “effect” of an employee’s workplace limitation stems from her
disability and how it affects her ability to perform the job’s essential
functions. By considering the limitation’s effect, the employer only considers
the disability and provides accommodations for it. An effect-based
comparator supports the broad interpretation of a similarly situated person.
Therefore, it may include employees who suffered from occupational
injuries,171 any subset of disabled employees—whether the disability occurred
on or off the job,172 any similarly disabled employees covered under the
ADA,173 or any employees with comparable conditions the employer offers
accommodations for.174 Petitioner Young and many other amici argued that
she should have been compared in this way. On behalf of the United States,
the Solicitor General argued that the appropriate comparators in Young were
“employees injured on the job, employees entitled to accommodations under
the version of the ADA applicable at the time, and drivers who had
temporarily lost their DOT certification and therefore required a non-driving
job.”175 The Solicitor General pointed to the legislature to support its position,
stating that “Congress did not distinguish among employees based on the
source of their work limitations. Congress distinguished among employees
based on the work-related effect of their work limitations.”176
If the effect of the limitation is taken into consideration, then when an
employer denies accommodations to a pregnant employee that were given to
other employees with similar conditions or disabilities, it has violated the
PDA’s second clause to treat pregnant employees the same as those “similar
170
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in their ability or inability to work.”177 By considering the employee’s
limitations and accommodating on that basis, the employer is being equal in
its accommodations in accordance with the PDA’s language “similar” in the
“inability to work.”
c.

Best solution

Overall, an effect-based comparator is the solution the Court should
adopt. When employers are considering the disability itself, the effect-view
extends the opportunity for pregnant employees to receive workplace
accommodations. It prompts employers to treat employees’ limitations or
disabilities equally and focus on the “extent of their ability to work” not the
pregnancy.178 The legislative intent of the PDA was to overrule Gilbert, in
which the Court held that employers could exclude pregnancy-related
disabilities from an employee’s disability plan.179 If the intent of the PDA was
to include pregnancy-related disabilities in employee disability plans,180 then
that conclusion points to an understanding that pregnancy-related
disabilities are like other disabilities. An effect-based comparator achieves
this end and ensures that employers treat the pregnancy-related disability “as
they treat any other health condition that causes similar limitations.”181
The Young Court ended with a powerful question that recognizes the
support of an effect-based interpretation. The majority asked, “when the
employer [has] accommodated so many, could it not accommodate pregnant
women as well?”182 This question captures an understanding of the effectbased comparator because it reinforces that many other employees receive
reasonable accommodations for their disabilities but pregnant employees
with the same disabilities do not—purely because the disabilities stem from
pregnancy. A pregnant employee would be able to compare herself to her
peers with similar disabilities and provide evidence of discrimination if it
occurs. On the other hand, an employer would be able to consider the
employee’s limitations and grant accommodations on that basis, not deny
them because the employee is pregnant and then face the possibility of
177
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litigation. The effect-based analysis would focus on an individual employee’s
ability and an individual employee’s limitations caused by pregnancy; this
employee-centric model would help facilitate communication between the
employer and employee to fulfill the individual needs of the employee. Not
only would this approach benefit pregnant employees, but it would also
benefit employers by allowing them to forego adopting an overarching policy
that would police every pregnant employee. Instead, employers would be able
to create individualized plans, as needed. For example, an employer like UPS
would not have to adopt a policy that says all pregnant employees are not
allowed to deliver packages over twenty pounds. But instead, UPS would
accommodate pregnant employees with a twenty-pound lift limitation.
Overall, UPS may only be required to accommodate very few pregnant
employees, for a short period of time. With a better understanding of what
accommodations are required, through the mechanism of an employee
communicating her own limitations, an employer would be better able to
understand the law and how to enact compliant policies. Under an effectbased comparator, both employees and employers would more clearly
understand workplace accommodations.
Clarity should be one of the driving factors in the Court’s interpretation
of the PDA, which would create a better outcome for both employee and
employer. The lower courts would also have a better chance at developing a
unified understanding and creating stronger equity for all pregnant
employees regardless of the jurisdiction of the case. That is why the proposed
solution of an effect-based or even source-based analysis would have been a
better solution for employers and employees. The broad and narrow
arguments the Court considered in Young, making nonpregnant peers or
ADA disabled peers the comparator, should be abandoned. Instead, a source
or effect-based understanding of limitations should be adopted to establish
clear boundaries for workplace accommodations for pregnant employees.
Furthermore, the adoption of the effect-based comparator would be more
efficient and fair.
A.

Difficulty After Young

Without a clear comparator, the lower courts have had difficulty in
applying the Young framework. A case with similar facts to those in Young
recently made its way to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
considered whether discrimination occurred when an employer denied the
pregnant employee’s accommodations request. In Durham v. Rural/Metro
Corp., Durham’s job as an EMT required her to lift up to one-hundred
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pounds on a regular basis.183 However, Durham’s doctor limited her lifting to
fifty pounds for the remainder of her pregnancy.184 She applied to be
transferred to light-duty work for the remainder of her pregnancy but was
denied an accommodation.185 The employer, Rural, denied these
accommodations because it did not provide accommodations to those
injured off the job except on a case-by-case basis.186 Durham then filed a suit
alleging discrimination under the PDA.187
The Eleventh Circuit stated that Durham’s claim “presents a question of
first impression as to how to implement the Young test.”188 It held that the
district court was mistaken when it dismissed Durham’s claim and reasoned
its analysis was incorrect in comparing her to nonpregnant EMTs.189 The
district court “erroneously” considered nonpregnant EMTs to be dissimilar
“in their ability or inability to work.”190 The Eleventh Circuit vacated and
remanded Durham’s case, holding instead that the comparator is based on
whether an employee is limited in her ability to lift and therefore the same in
her “inability to work.”191 The court considered the Supreme Court’s decision
in Young to be informative with regard to the fourth prong of the analysis, in
which the focus should be “one’s ability to do the job.”192 However, the
concurrence brings up an important point in the Court’s application of
Young.193 The concurrence stated that the facts of Young’s case and the
number of potential comparators in UPS’s workplace triggered the Supreme
Court’s conclusion, but noted that it is “not altogether clear the
accommodation of which categories of employees triggered the Court’s
conclusion.”194
Durham represents district courts’ lack of understanding of PDA claims
and circuit courts’ uncertainty in interpreting the PDA. The concurring
opinion in Durham recognized the complexities of answering the
comparator question when comparators are decided on the basis of
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categories of employees.195 However, if the Court answered the comparator
question in Young, and focused on the limitation’s source or effect, then
litigating claims under the PDA would be less ambiguous. The Eleventh
Circuit came close to deciding the comparator on an effect basis when it
concluded the focus was on the “ability to do the job.”196 But even with the
focus on the ability, it is unclear what an appropriate comparator would be
in situations like that in Durham. If the Eleventh Circuit had applied the
effect-based comparator, as this Note suggests, the outcome would have been
the same, but the reasoning would have been more effective. For example,
under the effect-based comparator, Durham would have been
accommodated on the basis of a lifting disability, because nonpregnant
EMT’s have accommodations for their lifting disabilities.
Although the Eleventh Circuit has been one of the only circuits to apply
the Young analysis, a recent class-action lawsuit settled for $14 million in a
federal district court in the Seventh Circuit.197 Walmart was accused of
discrimination under the PDA for denying pregnant employees reasonable
workplace accommodations.198 The class-action consisted of 4,000 employees
that had been denied reasonable accommodations because of pregnancy over
a period of one year.199 Walmart had implemented a pregnancy-blind policy,
much like UPS’s, in which it provided other employees with disabilities
accommodations while explicitly excluding pregnant employees from
receiving those accommodations.200 Some believe that this settlement is a
reflection of the current state of bringing a discrimination claim under the
PDA and that, even after Young, there is a “heavy burden on pregnant
workers to demonstrate that an employer discriminated.”201 For employers,
this settlement “sends a clear message to employers across the country about
why pregnancy accommodations have to be a focus, and why pregnant
workers’ health and safety is a key issue for businesses.”202
Durham and the recent Walmart settlement represent the aftermath of
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Young and its application to cases going forward. Since the Court in Young
left the comparator question unanswered, there is uncertainty as to who an
appropriate comparator is for a pregnancy discrimination case. However,
this unanswered question gives the Court another opportunity to properly
answer this question and create a fair opportunity for pregnant employees to
continue their cases past summary judgement. It also allows employers to be
more aware of the importance of their legal obligations to their pregnant
employees. The implementation of an effect-based comparator would
contribute to a more reasonable and individualized process for all parties
involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Pregnancy is an issue employers and employees will continue to address.
As society observes an ever-expanding workforce consisting of women and
mothers the law must take the steps needed to achieve equity in this sector of
the workforce. Congress took steps to do this in 1978 by passing the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act to overrule the discriminatory notions of
Gilbert.203 In 2015, the Court took steps to consider the problem of workplace
discrimination against pregnant employees by taking up Young v. UPS,
Inc.,204 but it still left the comparator question unanswered, which impacts
the achievement of equality the PDA intended to resolve.
The best solution to Young’s unanswered comparator question is the
source verses effect comparison analysis. By answering the comparator
question in this way, the lower courts would better understand how to apply
the McDonnell Douglas framework and determine if an employee established
a prima facie case. Although both proposed solutions provide clarity and
ultimately more protection for both employers and pregnant employees, the
effect-based comparator is a stronger solution for both. A pregnant employee
would have clarity in what accommodations she can receive, based on her
limitations, when she requests accommodations from the employer.
Additionally, employers would be able to protect themselves from liability
and litigation when a request for accommodations is made. While the PDA
has provided pregnant women with some protection from discrimination in
the workplace, the Court’s lack of clarity in the Young interpretation has
proved to leave employees and employers with little understanding of
appropriate application. A future judicial interpretation adopting an effectbased comparator is the solution for achieving an understanding of the rights
pregnant employees have in the workplace. A judicial decision that reaches
203
204

See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
Young v. UPS, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 231 (2015).

194

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

for a better understanding of the unique workforce of mothers and interprets
the PDA to achieve the clarity discussed throughout this Note is a decision
that reflects the true intent of equity for all in the workforce.

